




UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM



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Desert Storm Operations

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FOREWORD

This is one of a series of monographs describing and assessing the role of the United States Army Reserve in the winning of the war in the Persian Gulf. Countless reports have been written and numerous books published about the coalition victory. None have appeared, however, that focus on the valuable contributions of Army Reserve soldiers and civilians to the favorable outcome of the conflict. This monograph and others in the series fill that void.

This report on the role of the Army Reserve in installation operations demonstrates one of the core competencies provided to America's Army by Army Reservists. It is a description of the activation and success achieved by Army Reserve soldiers in four units that had the mission to augment Active Army installations as a part of the CONUS mobilization base.

Other monographs have been issued describing the roles of a variety of Army Reserve units and individual soldiers. They include civil affairs, military police, engineers, medical, signal, infantry, intelligence, trainers, transporters, port units and individual Reservists. Future monographs will cover Army Reserve logistics and administrative units. The entire group of monographs combine to form a comprehensive evaluation of the Army Reserve in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Your comments on this and future monographs are most welcome.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE:

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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM
INSTALLATION OPERATIONS:

The Role of USAR Garrisons

DISCLAIMER STATEMENT

The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other official documentation.

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have been the authors and editors of this report.

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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
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Introduction

"This is a ROARING BULL message!" With that telephonic announcement, Mr. Al Bredlau, the Mobilization Planner at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, notified then-LTC Bill Raines, the Commander of the 3397th USAR Garrison in Chattanooga, Tennessee, that his organization was alerted for activation for Operation DESERT SHIELD. LTC Raines had only been in command for about three weeks. The alert came on 25 August 1990.¹ On 27 August 1990, the 3397th and two other USAR Garrisons were activated and moved to their mobilization stations. A fourth Garrison would be called three months later.

Most Reservists in U.S. Army Reserve Garrisons never dreamed they would be activated. To many Reservists, assignment to a USAR Garrison was a holding assignment between "good" jobs in other troop program units. Few people not assigned to an Active Army or Army Reserve Garrison organization realized the value of the Garrisons, that is until Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM brought the value of these units to the forefront. Now the organizations are in great demand by most mobilization stations, both in FORSCOM and TRADOC, because of the timely augmentation that the mobilized Garrisons brought to their respective installations at a time when the workload was overwhelming.

Origin and Purpose of Garrisons in the USAR

The current USAR Garrisons had their origins in organizations which were developed in the late 1940's and were called "Complement, Post, Camp, or Station Training." Depending on the size of the post, camp, or station they were designed to support, they were designated parenthetically as (small), (medium), or (large). These Complements were placed in the Army Reserve to activate and operate a military installation in the event of mobilization. This was to preclude the halting and bumbling openings and reactivations of military installations, that had been experienced just a few short years before, as the armed forces expanded rapidly during the

World War II mobilization. The concept was that the unit would command the post of Camp "x" and provide for the efficient and economical operation, administration, training, service, and supply of all individuals, units, and activities thereon, except those functions and command responsibilities specifically retained by the U.S. Continental Army Commander or the head of a Department of the Army Agency.²

Initially consisting of approximately 25 officers, the Complements grew over the years until they reached a strength of about 350 (100+ officers and warrant officers, and 250 enlisted personnel). By the late 1960's, the TDA of these organizations contained the numbers and skills in the various functional services to make the unit self-supporting. By 1965, there were 18 of these units on the rolls of the Army Reserve.³ By that time, their designations had evolved to numbered U.S. Army Reserve Garrisons.

Throughout the 1970's the Garrisons retained their original purpose and their strength remained about 350. As the Army downsized after Vietnam in the mid and late 1970's, Garrisons became more oriented toward specific installations. The CAPSTONE program developed in U.S. Forces Command in the early 1980's, coupled with a heightened commitment to mobilization preparedness, planning and exercises, further refined and strengthened the relationships between certain USAR Garrisons and their supported installations. In some cases the USAR Garrisons were earmarked to support an expanded operational mission for the installation during mobilization; in other cases the USAR Garrison provided most of the operational staff for the supported installation. Whichever the case, the CAPSTONE alignment fostered a closer affiliation for training and operational support between the USAR Garrison and its supported installation, thus validating the original intent of the concept developed for the early post, camp, or station Complements.

This, then was the situation in the summer of 1990 as the Army geared up to support the Gulf War with Iraq. The number of Reserve Garrisons had dropped to 11 and TDA modifications (reductions) were in various stages of implementation at the time the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) was authorized in late August. Those USAR Garrisons in the force structure at that time are reflected in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

USAR Garrisons⁴
(As of August 1990)

USAR Garrison	Home Station	Mobilization Station
1079th USAR Garrison*	Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA	Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA
1209th USAR Garrison	Mattydale, NY	Ft. Drum, NY
2122nd USAR Garrison*	Baltimore, MD	Ft. A.P. Hill, VA
2174th USAR Garrison*	Salem, VA	Ft. Pickett, VA
3220th USAR Garrison*	West Palm Beach, FL	Ft. Stewart, GA
3397th USAR Garrison*	Chattanooga, TN	Ft. Campbell, KY
4003rd USAR Garrison*	Oklahoma City, OK	Ft. Chaffee, AR
4013th USAR Garrison*	Bossier City, LA	Ft. Polk, LA
5064th USAR Garrison*	Inkster, MI	Ft. McCoy, WI
6211th USAR Garrison	Presidio San Francisco, CA	Presidio San Francisco, CA
7581st USAR Garrison	Ft. Buchanan, PR	Ft. Buchanan, PR

* Remain in the force structure at this time.

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

Activation of USAR Garrisons

The Presidential decision to deploy forces to Saudi Arabia in Operation DESERT SHIELD created a need for activation of several USAR Garrisons (Figure 2.), to support the deployment of Active Army units, to fill the void created by deploying Active Army forces, and to facilitate the activation and deployment of Reserve Component forces. The early deployment of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fort Stewart, Georgia, necessitated the augmentation of

those installations Active Army garrisons to meet the concurrent deployment of the divisions and the activation and deployment of Army Reserve and National Guard units. Both installations had USAR Garrisons that were trained and prepared to execute the installation augmentation mission. At Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, a semi-active installation used mostly for RC unit training, the installation garrison organization was inadequate for the mission of activating and deploying a large number of RC units. The affiliated USAR Garrison was needed to provide the installation the capability to execute its assigned mission as a mobilization station. At Fort Polk, Louisiana, the anticipated deployment of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the activation of RC units, including the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from the Louisiana Army National Guard made the activation of the affiliated USAR Garrison a necessity, albeit later in the Fall of 1990.

Figure 2.

USAR Garrisons Activated for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM⁵

USAR Garrison	Home Station	Mobilization Station	Activation Date
3220th USAR Garrison	West Palm Beach, Florida	Fort Stewart, Georgia	27 August 1990
3397th USAR Garrison	Chattanooga, Tennessee	Fort Campbell, Kentucky	27 August 1990
4013th USAR Garrison	Bossier City, Louisiana	Fort Polk, Louisiana	28 November 1990
5064th USAR Garrison	Inkster, Michigan	Fort McCoy, Wisconsin	27 August 1990

Installations Without a USAR Garrison

Those four installations having a USAR Garrison activated to support mobilization activities were fortunate. Those without a USAR Garrison had a difficult time executing their mobilization mission. They had to establish an organization from their own assets for the command and control of mobilizing units. As well, they stretched the capability of their staff

resources to support the mobilization processing of Reserve Component units and individuals, making it necessary to curtail other activities and expend resources allocated for other purposes.

Because of the restrictions placed upon the implementation of the PSRC by Defense Secretary Cheney and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army was forced to establish ceilings on the number of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) authorized for call-up by their gaining commands.⁶ This further hindered the execution of the mobilization station mission at installations without an activated USAR Garrison. Installations with a relatively small garrison organization, e.g., Forts Meade, Lee, A.P. Hill, Sheridan, and Benjamin Harrison, had a difficult time stretching their resources to execute their mobilization mission. Larger installations with major deploying units, e.g., Forts Riley (1st Infantry Division) and Sill (III Corps Artillery), were also stretched and needed RC augmentation.

As the mobilization of Reserve Component units and individuals progressed in phases throughout the Fall of 1990 to support Operation DESERT SHIELD, the emphasis was on getting defensive forces to the Gulf. For example, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) did not request support from the Reserves, thus making available to the CENTCOM CINC the maximum available Reserve spaces within the allocated ceilings established. Thus, TRADOC installations suffered a real skilled manpower shortage just when they most needed augmentation to support their mobilization station missions. In fact, only through volunteers did TRADOC receive any assistance from the Reserves until Partial Mobilization was declared in January, 1991.⁷ By that time, the bulk of the mobilizing RC units had passed through the mobilization stations and deployed to the operational theater. No TRADOC installation received USAR Garrison augmentation during Operations DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM.

Other RC Installation Support

The mission of supporting the mobilization processing, training, and deployment of RC units, their equipment and individuals necessitated that specialized RC units, other than the USAR Garrisons, be activated also to bolster the services at most installations. This augmentation consisted of adjutant general, finance, military police, signal, transportation, medical and dental, and supply and maintenance units. They provided services over and above what the normal installation staff and the USAR Garrison, where activated, could render to the deploying troops. In many cases, it would not have been possible to deploy the Active Army units, much less the large numbers of RC units that transited through mobilization stations without such support. The successful operation of these mobilization stations was clearly a "One Army" achievement. Similar supporting functions during the demobilization process were just as important, as limited time was allowed to out-process troops and return equipment to units

or storage facilities such as Equipment Concentration Sites (ECS).

* * * * *

The remainder of this historical monograph examines the operations of each of the activated USAR Garrisons at the installations that they supported. Their utilization, relationships with the installation staff, and the problems they discovered and overcame in their respective experiences all combine to give a wide appreciation for the unique contributions these organizations made to the successful mobilization and demobilization attendant to the Gulf War. An issue involving the TDA modifications of all USAR Garrisons is reviewed with the intent of surfacing the several facets of this ongoing initiative.

4013th USAR Garrison

Before the Activation⁸

For many years, the 4013th USAR Garrison was subject to call to active duty at any military installation. Annual training was performed at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, Fort Irwin, California, as well as Fort Polk, Louisiana. For several years prior to Operation DESERT STORM the 4013th had been aligned with Fort Polk and performed annual training (AT) there. This annual training was performed one or two times a year, primarily with counterpart staff. The Fort Polk installation staff was tasked to find training opportunities or projects that the 4013th soldiers could perform. There was little routine coordination between the installation staff and the 4013th, other than during these training periods. Much of the effort by the 4013th between AT periods was focused on their role as a major intermediate command of the 122nd Army Reserve Command (ARCOM). In that capacity, the 4013th was responsible for the training, administration and readiness of a number of deployable USAR units throughout Louisiana. That role consumed the time of the leadership of the 4013th, preventing them from having an active integrating role with Fort Polk. Because of the unlikely requirement for the activation of a USAR Garrison, the emphasis of the 122nd ARCOM and the 4013th was on their command role over deployable units. For that reason, the command element of the 4013th had not trained during AT at Fort Polk in the years preceding Operation DESERT SHIELD. Only the counter- part staff training had been accomplished.

In 1990, the 4013th USAR Garrison was designated a QUICKSILVER unit and scheduled for deactivation. A deactivation ceremony was held by the unit on 14 October 1990 and the unit

was officially scheduled to be deactivated on the next day. All the equipment and all the personnel, except the few required to wind down operations, had been transferred out. On 15 October 1990, deactivation day, the deactivation order was delayed for 90 days. On 27 November 1990, only 45 days after the deactivation had been delayed, the 4013th was alerted for activation. The next day the unit was activated. On 1 December 1990, the 4013th reported to Fort Polk to assume its mobilization mission. On 26 July 1991, the orders deactivating the 4013th were revoked, allowing it to remain in the USAR force structure. The close relationship developed during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM between the 4013th and Fort Polk has become the basis for a continuing relationship that includes all elements of the 4013th and the Fort Polk staff. The 4013th is no longer an intermediate command with responsibility for subordinate units, making it free to concentrate now on its primary mission of augmenting the staff at Fort Polk.

Role at Fort Polk

The need for augmentation of Fort Polk was recognized by the installation staff in August 1990. The Fort Polk request for the activation of the 4013th was not acted upon until November, probably because of the scheduled deactivation of the unit. Because of the scheduled deactivation, much of the talent that had been a part of the 4013th was not available at activation and the strength of the unit was considerably below what it had been only a few months earlier.⁹

The arrival of the 4013th at Fort Polk afforded the installation staff sections some much needed relief from the vastly increased workload caused by the activation of Army Reserve and National Guard units at the installation. Most staff elements had been operating extended working hours to meet the rigid schedule of unit activations and deployments. The situation at Fort Polk was about to reach a critical stage with the activation of the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), the round-out unit from the Louisiana Army National Guard to the 5th Infantry Division. With a minimum of processing and train-up effort, soldiers of the 4013th assumed their duties throughout the garrison staff. The 4013th soldiers wore the FORSCOM patch, helping them to blend into the Fort Polk Garrison operation. Only the wider collars on their BDUs gave a clue that they were Reservists.¹⁰

Augmentation of the Fort Polk Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was quickly accomplished and within 18 days members of the 4013th were operating the entire EOC.¹¹ So smooth was the integration of the 4013th soldiers into the EOC that they were not recognized as Reservists. The operation of the EOC was turned over to the personnel of the 4013th without loss in effectiveness or efficiency. The 4013th personnel quickly established a "comfort level" with their counterpart Active Army and Army National Guard personnel of the installation. The

resourcefulness of the 4013th EOC staff made it possible for the 256th Brigade personnel to get home from Fort Hood for Christmas. This was accomplished by coordinating the use of school buses from throughout the state of Louisiana that were idle during the school Christmas vacation period.¹²

One of the major functions performed by the 4013th was the command and control of activated RC units. This was accomplished by the command group of the 4013th, augmented by key personnel to fill out the necessary supporting staff elements. This function was an ideal mission for the command element of the garrison and it solved a major problem for the installation. On other installations without a USAR garrison, the command and control element for activating RC units had to be taken out of hide at the expense of other activities.¹³

The military police element of the 4013th provided a critical augmentation to the Fort Polk Law Enforcement Command. The professionalism of the RC MPs was a lesson for the Regulars who gained a new appreciation for the "part-time soldiers". This allowed the USAR MPs to be full partners in sharing the installation law enforcement responsibility. Some families reported feeling safer with the RC MPs around.¹⁴

The 4013th operated both the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (A/DACG) at England Air Force Base near Alexandria, Louisiana, and the Port Support Activity (PSA) at the Port of Beaumont, Texas. A/DACG members learned their jobs through On-the-Job Training (OJT) with the Fort Polk Transportation Section personnel. They attempted to perform operations on a two-shift operation but found that in many cases everyone was required at the airfield to deploy some units. In addition to deploying RC units for Operation DESERT STORM, the 4013th A/DACG element supported the deployment of two brigade rotations to the National Training Center and the deployment and redeployment of an RC engineer unit for Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) in Honduras. At the Port of Beaumont, the 4013th PSA had to solve the problems associated with MILVANs improperly marked for contents and/or destination. In both areas, the 4013th efforts were critical to the level of success achieved.¹⁵

The 4013th Adjutant General Section provided the robustness and added talent needed to process the activated RC soldiers for Operation DESERT STORM. Additionally, 4013th personnel provided the manpower to maintain the personnel records of the units while they were in the Gulf. This assisted materially during the redeployment phase in the preparation of the DD214s for the RC soldiers being released from active duty. The AG Section overcame the problems associated with the different SIDPERS systems in use by the Active Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard. They also had to deal with National Guard personnel accountability problems (e.g., activation of a "deceased" soldier and deployment of a REFRAD soldier to Saudi Arabia) and the promotion of all Guard soldiers one grade upon activation in

one major unit.¹⁶

One of the interesting challenges facing the 4013th was the activation of a group of approximately 400 doctors who were sent to Fort Polk for mobilization processing. These doctors were to augment hospitals throughout the AMEDD. Most of the doctors had no previous military service, were unfamiliar with military uniforms, were upset about being called to active duty, and presented an interesting situation in command and control. The doctors were called the "GOD (gaggle of doctors) Battalion", because of the many trying events that occurred during their processing. In one instance, the 4013th arranged for the marriage of a doctor from St. Louis, who had been scheduled to be married shortly after he was activated. The wedding was performed as originally scheduled.¹⁷

During the return of soldiers from Operation DESERT STORM an M-16 rifle was left on one of the charter flights bringing soldiers to England Air Force Base. The weapon loss was discovered just after the aircraft departed England AFB for its next destination. Fortunately, the soldier knew exactly where he had placed the weapon and it could easily be found by the crew when the plane landed. Through ingenuity and resourcefulness, 4013th EOC personnel were able to contact the airline, identify the next stop of the plane, and arrange recovery of the weapon. The weapon was returned to Fort Polk without further incident.¹⁸

Throughout Fort Polk, augmentation by personnel from the staff sections of the 4013th made it possible to accomplish the mission of training mobilized RC units and deploying them to the Gulf. Had it been necessary for the 5th Infantry Division to have deployed, the installation would have had the capability to continue mobilization station operations. Without the augmentation provided by the 4013th, that would not have been possible.

In addition to the 4013th, three additional RC units were activated and remained at Fort Polk to provide base operations support. These units are reflected in the chart at Figure 3. A total of 33 RC units with 9,212 personnel and 307 IRR personnel were activated at Fort Polk for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Figure 3.

Fort Polk Base Operations Support Units¹⁹

Unit	Component	Home Station
296th Medical Company (Ambulance)	ARNG	Charleston, Arkansas
364th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance)	USAR	Vicksburg, Mississippi
4101st USA Hospital	USAR	New Orleans, Louisiana
4013th USAR Garrison	USAR	Bossier City, Louisiana

Command and Control Responsibilities²⁰

Colonel Larry Rambin, Commander of the 4013th USAR Garrison, was given the responsibility for command and control of all activated RC units at Fort Polk, less the 256th Infantry Brigade. In this capacity he was treated like any other colonel-level commander on the installation. Operation of the command structure for activating units was a mission ideally suited for the garrison command group. Colonel Rambin found that it was necessary to be assertive at times, but that in doing so he built respect and confidence in the ability of the Reservists to accomplish their job.

By using the 4013th to command the activating RC units, there was no duplication of command and control functions of the post. This provisional command operated by the 4013th had the structure and unit cohesion normally found only in permanent organizations, making it immediately effective in its role.

Relationships with the Installation Commander and Staff

The 4013th was treated just like the rest of the permanent party Fort Polk Garrison--not like a group of Reservists. They established a good working relationship at Fort Polk because they were willing to take any mission and execute it well. By the soldiers of the 4013th wearing the FORSCOM patch, the same as the Active Army garrison personnel, they helped cement their role as a part of the installation team. Overall, the 4013th received full cooperation and support from the personnel at Fort Polk, with only minor exceptions.

In most cases the 4013th staff elements were treated as part of the installation staff. There were some few exceptions. The 4013th Chaplains, LTC Lee Dixon and CPT Ed Grice, were denied access to chaplain supplies by the chaplains of the 5th Division. The division chaplains were apparently holding on to their supplies in anticipation of deployment of the division to the Gulf--which never happened. The 4013th chaplains overcame these minor problems and established effective programs for religious and family support. They developed a strong family support program, state-wide, through their ties to local and state church organizations. So effective were the programs initiated by the 4013th chaplains, that Chaplain (LTC) Lee Dixon was invited to be a briefer at the FORSCOM Chaplains Conference, speaking on the Garrison's Operation DESERT STORM experiences.²¹

Problems at the Installation

Because the 4013th had been scheduled for deactivation, it was without the lawyers in its JAG Section. This problem was solved by assigning JAG officers to the Garrison from other units in the 122nd ARCOM. This, and the activation of the 256th Brigade, resulted in a grade imbalance in the JAG Section. The permanent installation JAG personnel were out-ranked by the JAG officers of the 4013th and 256th. Besides grade problems, there was the added challenge of having politically influential personnel serving in key JAG positions. This latter problem had an influence on some of the mutiny trials in the 256th Brigade while that organization trained at Fort Hood. The grade structure problem has been solved through the civilianization of some of the JAG leadership positions on the Fort Polk Garrison staff.²²

Other key personnel shortages caused by the scheduled deactivation of the 4013th had only a minor impact on the operation of the 4013th as a part of the Fort Polk Garrison. The loss of personnel denied Fort Polk of some of the talent that had previously been available in the 4013th.

After-Action Report Issues

Revisions to the 4013th USAR Garrison TDA will impact on the ability of the organization to effectively accomplish its mobilization mission. An example of this is the loss of the Chaplain Assistant positions. This seriously restricts the ability of the staff chaplains to provide support to RC units mobilizing at Fort Polk and their family members.

Effective pre-mobilization training for the USAR Garrison is best accomplished in performing the day-to-day garrison functions. The close proximity of the USAR Garrison and

its supported installation facilitates that training. Close, continuous cooperation and frequent liaison are essential ingredients to building team harmony. The 4013th's home station in Bossier City affords frequent opportunities for working with the Fort Polk Garrison located less than 100 miles away. It affords a great opportunity for realistic operational training on a regular basis, building on the favorable experience of Operation DESERT STORM.

Family Support

The Family Support program was enhanced through the efforts of the Directorate of Community and Family Support, headed by Mr. Joe LaGrone, and the Army Community Services (ACS) organization. ACS published a newsletter for RC families to provide information about services that were available from the military. The newsletter is still published, albeit less frequently. The family support structure was tied to the ARCOM and State Area Command (STARC) through local National Guard armories and Reserve centers, both of which are considered local community assets throughout the region.²³

3220th USAR Garrison

The early activation of the 3220th USAR Garrison was critical to the deployment of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fort Stewart, Georgia. It was also a key factor in supporting the activation, training, preparation, and deployment of mobilized RC units, as well as providing support to the activation and training of the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from the Georgia Army National Guard. When these units redeployed back through Fort Stewart, the 3220th assisted with their demobilization processing as well.

Augmenting the 3220th USAR Garrison was a variety of USAR and ARNG support units. These units are shown in Figure 4. Another sixty soldiers from various U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools served as casualty assistance officers and points-of-contact for family support groups in the general area. The 3271st USAR Hospital provided backfill to the Fort Stewart Community Hospital for those health care professionals who had deployed with medical units as a part of the Professional Officer Filler System (PROFIS).²⁴

Figure 4.

Fort Stewart Base Operations Support Units

Unit	Component	Home Station
166th Maintenance Company	ARNG	Hinesville, Georgia
453rd Finance Company	USAR	Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania
461st Personnel Services Company	USAR	Atlanta, Georgia
629th Medium Truck Company	USAR	Du Bois, Pennsylvania
3220th USAR Garrison	USAR	West Palm Beach, Florida
3271st USA Hospital	USAR	Charleston, South Carolina

Status at the Time of Activation

In January 1990 the 3220th was advised by its higher headquarters, the 81st ARCOM, that it would be inactivated. Within a month that was put on hold and the Garrison was advised it would downsize from a strength of 326 to 125. Rumors were rampant; clearly major realignments were in the offing. By the time Operation DESERT SHIELD kicked off, the unit strength was about 150. Indeed, soldiers had been leaving the unit looking for slots in other USAR units and even in units of the Florida Army National Guard. The leadership was actively trying to place their personnel also because of the uncertainty facing the unit's future.

When Mr. Cliff Watson, the Chief of the Mobilization Branch in the Office of the Director of Plans, Training, and Mobilization (DPTM) at Fort Stewart, began to informally coordinate with the 3220th about the possibility of their activation, the unit's leaders began to scramble to recapture personnel who had been formerly assigned. Once it became known the 3220th was to be called to active duty, many former members returned to the unit on their own. Fortunately, most of those personnel could be placed back in their same slots in the TDA so as to help staff the installation's directorates.

The 3220th was alerted at 0450 hours on 25 August 1990 and activated on 27 August 1990 as soon as the PSRC was announced. On 30 August 1990 the Garrison deployed to Fort Stewart essentially at full strength.²⁵ Indeed, three and one-half hours after the unit had been activated, an advance party was on the road to Fort Stewart to coordinate the Garrison's arrival.

The advanced information network which had been developed informally over the years paid dividends for both the Garrison and the installation.

Role at Fort Stewart

The 3220th USAR Garrison provided the command and control element for all activating RC units at Fort Stewart except the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Georgia Army National Guard, a round-out brigade for the 24th Infantry Division. Additionally, the Garrison manned the Mobilization Operations Center (the EOC type facility that managed the mobilization and deployment operations), the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (A/DACG) at Hunter Army Airfield and provided support operations at the Jacksonville port. Soldiers from the 3220th augmented staff sections 24 hours a day in such diverse areas as personnel and administration, finance, logistics, the chaplains' office, the post emergency operations center, information management and in dining facilities.²⁶

Command and Control Responsibilities

Colonel Ronnell Burgamy, a 27 year veteran of Army Reserve service who had served in Vietnam was the Commander of the 3220th when it was activated. Although it was planned that he would become the Director at DPTM upon the Garrison's activation, that staff section had just received a newly assigned director who was not to deploy with the 24th Infantry Division. Colonel Burgamy was then assigned as the Deputy to the Installation Commander, a Colonel Frank Miller who had been Assistant Division Commander and had been designated by Major General McCaffrey to remain at Fort Stewart as the Commander. Colonel Burgamy and Colonel Miller got along well and supported each other.

Colonel Burgamy supervised the RC units' mobilization and formed a provisional battalion within the 3220th to provide these units' (less the 48th Brigade) command and control. Colonel Burgamy formed a Mobilization Command to perform his supervisory function over the RC units' activities and under it he put the Mobilization Operations Center, the A/DACG, and the provisional battalion. This worked well, even though an ad hoc arrangement, since many of the detachments and units activated and processed through Fort Stewart had no higher headquarters and needed someone senior for advice, assistance, and support.²⁷ A third colonel, Colonel Cullen was the Active Component Fort Stewart Garrison Commander, and he supervised post activities.

Relationships with the Installation Commander and Staff

The 3220th USAR Garrison had for years enjoyed a very favorable relationship with counterpart staff members at Fort Stewart. Mr. Watson had worked closely with the Garrison command group in coordinating support plans for mobilization and planning exercises and knew the Garrison personnel well.

After the 3220th reported to Fort Stewart, and before all elements of the 24th Infantry Division had deployed, relationships with the division's command group and staff grew distant. Post support functions were virtually eliminated from the division's daily routine as that organization concentrated on preparing for deployment to the Gulf. Fundamentally, MG McCaffrey let the residual civilian staff worry about post support to activating Reserve and National Guard soldiers. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was more and more an action agency for division activities and information gathering for the CG and his deploying staff. At the same time, more and more RC units were being identified for mobilization at Fort Stewart and began to report to the installation for processing and mobilization station activities. RC issues began to grow, therefore, and with the CG, his staff, and his EOC worried primarily about division matters, some other organizational entities had to worry about Reserve matters. Mr. Watson and the 3220th with their slowly emerging Mobilization Operations Center (MOC) filled that role. Once the divisional elements deployed, and the newly formed command and staff relationships became familiar and mutually supporting, attitudes improved greatly and attention turned to the mobilization station functions.

The biggest initial irritant the Garrison had to face when they arrived at Fort Stewart was obtaining barracks space. There was no permanent barracks space available for awhile, that could be turned over to the 3220th, since the division was still in the process of getting ready to go to the Gulf. The 3220th was put in a National Guard area of the post for a couple of months in unimproved barracks without air conditioning. It was quite awhile before they were assigned into the newer billets of the 4th Battalion, 64th Armor. Mobilizing units were in similar sub-standard accommodations in the Guard area, however, their stay at Fort Stewart was temporary. When the 24th Division left Fort Stewart for the Gulf the divisional units did not secure their organizational, and in some cases personal, equipment. This had to be picked up, packed, and the billets and mess halls cleaned. When elements of the division returned, the Garrison personnel had to scramble back into the ARNG area barracks. After about two months, as hot weather returned to Georgia, COL Burgamy obtained permission to lease some local hotel and motel rooms with air conditioning, and the troops stayed in those for their last couple of months on active duty. The bottom line was that most of the 3220th soldiers had to make four moves in the eleven months they were at Fort Stewart.²⁸

Support to the installation staff was reportedly superb in every functional area. Current staff supervisors who were present during the Operation DESERT SHIELD mobilization station activities and held responsible positions, are unanimous in their high regard of the 3220th soldiers.

Mr. Charles Shurtleff of the DPTM staff, who was the supervisor of the EOC at that time, noted that the 3220th rendered invaluable assistance to both the EOC and the MOC as the surge of mobilizing RC units began to stress the various support systems on the post.²⁹ He was very complimentary of the quality of the soldiers who manned both operations centers and of the administrative skills they possessed. He was particularly appreciative of the thoroughness of their coordinating skills because that helped greatly in aircraft scheduling with the A/DACG and in validating units for deployment. It was critical to have competent people in this function because the A/DACG at Hunter Army Air Field outloaded 12,765 soldiers on 132 aircraft and received 16,799 soldiers on 53 aircraft during redeployment.³⁰

Mrs. Janet Pearce of the Fort Stewart DPCA office was the supervisor of the Soldier Readiness Center (SRC), which operated all the POM processing for units at the post--divisional and mobilizing RC units. When the 24th Division deployed to the Gulf, they took all the AG, Finance, Legal, and Medical assets of the division with them. Assets for her to use in the processing of activating RC units and individuals had to come from the Reserves; they began to come in late August. The 3220th was a great assist as they had some of the support she needed, as well as supervisors for more junior technicians who came from an AG company, and a Finance company activated from the USAR to support the Garrison.

For much of the Fall of 1990, they processed people on a twelve hour a day basis. When the 48th Brigade began to activate at the post in November and December 1990, they went to a 24-hour a day operation and worked out of two gyms. Mrs. Pierce utilized the 3220th people as her shift OICs at that time and they responded exceptionally well. The 48th Brigade was processed in its entirety in five days.³¹

Mrs. Pearce reported a couple of humorous incidents that occurred at Fort Stewart and involved the 3220th personnel. One involved soldiers fearing immunization shots to the point that they tried everything to get out of them. That began to show itself the first week of activations. She got smart and began to color-code each station in the processing line, such that station supervisors from the 3220th initialed in a different color. When the troops got onto that and began to initial in that color themselves, particularly the station where the shots were given, she began to change the colors randomly throughout the day. Many soldiers got caught initialing their forms themselves and they had to then get a full battery of shots so that they would be protected in the Gulf.

Another incident involved a soldier from a USAR unit who was admitted to the hospital at Fort Stewart. While he was in there his unit finished its training and deployed. After his treatment was completed he was "discharged" from the hospital. He took it to mean discharged from the Army and he went home by bus. No one at Fort Stewart was aware of this. The unit had lost accountability for him after they deployed because they assumed he was under hospital or post control. All during Operation DESERT STORM he drew active duty pay and didn't report it. He was working at his old civilian job. He was caught because he applied for tuition assistance to advance his education. At the time that was being processed his status came to light. On three different occasions he was ordered to report to Fort Stewart to get back into the system, but he refused to do so. Finally the MPs physically apprehended him and he was put in jail until his court-martial³²--much to his surprise. That was another thing people just read about; no one would believe it would happen to them, just like the mobilization itself.

Mr. Jake Umholtz, the installation AG during Operation DESERT STORM, asserted that about 25-28 Garrison soldiers helped the AG office tremendously after the divisional administrative and finance units deployed to the Gulf. His AG office stored and maintained the personnel records from all the RC mobilizing units. Because the Active military and the DA Civilians were not familiar with the rules and regulatory requirements of the RC unit personnel files, Mr. Umholtz felt his shop was unprepared to administer them. He therefore organized the workload such that RC personnel from the 3220th and from an AG company that activated to support the garrison would do all the RC records maintenance. This worked well. He was very impressed with soldiers from the 3220th. Over 31,000 records of Active and Reserve soldiers were maintained at the post.³³

Residual Controls

The 24th Infantry Division Commander, Major General McCaffrey, and his staff never severed the apron string with Fort Stewart. He kept his thumb and full control on things via satellite communications. General McCaffrey left an ADC behind to command the post. That precluded FORSCOM or Second Army from assuming too much control. The ADC, Colonel Miller, was stretched in several directions at certain times, trying to satisfy the many pressures exerted on him and Fort Stewart.

General McCaffrey also placed severe restrictions on the authority of the stay-behind commander and the civilian staff. Universally, limitations placed on the use of funds for mobilizing Reserve units or facilities, such as billets, dining halls, and motor pools with their maintenance shops, were decried by the supervisors who had to perform the mobilization station functions.

These controls, in the form of guidance to the installation's key personnel and the continued exercise of command and control via instantaneous communications, unnecessarily complicated the smoothness of the mobilization and deployment of RC forces through Fort Stewart.

Problems Unique to Fort Stewart and the 3220th USAR Garrison

The Public Affairs Office (PAO) was inadequate to provide control of the press personnel that flocked to the installation to cover the deployment of both the 24th Infantry Division and the numerous units from the Reserve Components. The total staffing provided by the combined assets of the post's public affairs section and the augmentation from the 3220th USAR Garrison would probably have been adequate during normal levels of activity, but not during the early days of Operation DESERT SHIELD or the redeployment when there was great public interest in the first large scale mobilization since the Korean War.

In fact, Major Larry Floyd, the officer-in-charge of the A/DACG noted that during the redeployment of troops back from the Gulf, his biggest problem was control of the press. The PAO was not staffed at Hunter Army Airfield, where the planes brought the troops. Major Floyd said that the 3220th devoted many resources to controlling the press. Additionally, every general who had troops coming back through there wanted to welcome them home. So did politicians, particularly state governors, or their staffs, other state elected officials, and mayors. The A/DACG had to get a lot of radios, MP traffic control personnel, and other sharp soldiers to act as guides and escorts.³⁴ Fundamentally, no one could foresee this level of interest and activity, so the organizational staffing could not accommodate it.

Postal assets were inadequate to handle the large volume of mail that came to Fort Stewart. The problem was increased by the requirement to forward mail to the units of the 24th Division and the deploying RC units. The residual postal assets were inadequate to meet even the division's needs for sorting and forwarding of mail. The addition of RC units transiting through the installation increased the overload situation. Compounding the problem were the frequent changes of address in the Gulf for deploying RC units. Many RC units had several different APO addresses before reaching their final destination. RC units were not experienced in handling postal activities and their mail personnel, new to this requirement, required a substantial amount of training before they could perform their required postal duties.

Family support issues of all types became problems at Fort Stewart. The division took their military personnel from this office at the post when deploying to the Gulf. The 3220th assigned five personnel to the Family Support Office, to include the Chief. They augmented the

civilian personnel left behind by the 24th Infantry Division. Basically, their mission was to care for the family support needs of the RC units mobilizing at Fort Stewart, as well as helping the division families in need.

Tracking the status of sick and injured soldiers, casualty reports, preparing family support newsletters, and planning the welcoming ceremonies during redeployment required continual and lengthy coordination. Arranging for financial assistance from AER, borrowing kitchen appliances and furniture, running checks on soldiers to explain mail or phone delays, reducing rumors and worry, and generally keeping communications open with Army families provided Major John Knight, the Family Support Officer from the 3220th, with extraordinary self-satisfaction.³⁵

A major problem involved Family Care Plans, a requirement for both Active and Reserve Component soldiers who were single parents or dual military parent families. These plans for the most part were poorly prepared, inadequately coordinated or thought out, or non-existent. Many Active soldiers in the 24th Infantry Division expected no deployment other than to the National Training Center, and they had plans that could be executed for that short contingency. Most Reserve Component soldiers expected no activation longer than the two weeks of Annual Training (AT) and had plans to cover that period. Operation DESERT STORM deployments caught the large majority by surprise and left families scrambling for adequate coverage. Some never could accommodate the requirements and could not be deployed with their units.

One decision that Major General McCaffrey made that caused much trouble after hours was keeping the division soldiers in desert camouflage for six weeks after they got back. He didn't explain to his troops what a great support job the 3220th USAR Garrison and other USAR units had done during the Gulf War, whether in the Gulf or at Fort Stewart. The division troops acted big and tough in their desert camouflage and rubbed it in that the Reservists hadn't really been in the war. The Reservists responded and there were a lot of fights and friction on this score until the division returned to the dark green fatigue uniform. This could have been prevented with some indoctrination and common sense.³⁶

After-Action Report Issues

The TDA of the 3220th USAR Garrison needs some revision to eliminate vestigial elements such as club management, clothing sales, ambulances and some other unnecessary provisions. On the other hand, there are many requirements, newly discovered during the Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM experience, which need to be provided for on the TDA. An expanded A/DACG, postal clerks, strength management personnel in the

DPCA office, signal soldiers for the DOIM, manning for a Family Support Office, and helicopters for medevac are but a few areas highlighted for corrective action. A definitive review of all the USAR Garrison TDAs is required to accommodate the needs of their supported installations. The ideal review would consider the coverage of functional areas when the major organization on that post, e.g., the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, deploys. If a function no longer can be accomplished, that should be reflected in the provisions of the TDA of the supporting USAR Garrison. The Garrison TDA, in effect, would include the requirements of the installation's mobilization TDA, as well as accommodating the post augmentation required at time of mobilization.

5064th USAR Garrison

The circumstances affecting the mobilization and utilization of the 5064th USAR Garrison from Inkster, Michigan were quite different from those experienced by the three other USAR Garrisons that were mobilized for support to Operation DESERT SHIELD. This was due to the fact that the 5064th mobilization mission was to augment Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, a semi-active Army installation, as opposed to those large division posts that the other Garrisons supported.

The ramifications of that difference are many, but can be summarized in the notion that augmentation was required immediately. There was no slack time because there were limited personnel on post to do the work, unlike at the division posts. Every single functional area that supported the mobilization and deployment of Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers needed beefing up--and immediately.

That also means there was no time for post-mobilization training or administrative catch-up. The Garrison had to be ready immediately because Fort McCoy is one of the biggest mobilization stations in the nation and the units pour in from day one. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the 5064th received 74 units, their equipment, and over 9,000 soldiers, processed them and their equipment for air and surface deployment to the Gulf and later demobilized these units and their equipment at the end of hostilities.³⁷

A USAR Garrison does not have on its authorization documents nearly the capability to provide adequately the various functional activities that are essential to a mobilization, so the Garrison organization itself needs augmentation. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM the 5064th was itself augmented at Fort McCoy. In addition to the units

shown in Figure 5, the 84th Division Band from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and the 70th Division Band from Livonia, Michigan, supported all departure and welcoming home ceremonies, and Readiness Group Snelling from Fort Snelling, Minnesota, coordinated, supervised, and provided individual survival skills training to soldiers from mobilizing RC units before they could be validated for deployment.³⁸ Elements of the 757th Transportation Battalion (Railway) provided rail support for equipment out-loading.³⁹ Thus in addition to the normal installation staff section personnel and Equipment Concentration Site (ECS) McCoy personnel, who belonged to the 86th ARCOM, many other units assisted the 5064th Garrison in doing the post support mission.

Figure 5.

Fort McCoy Base Operations Support Units

Unit	Component	Home Station
153rd Finance Support Unit	ARNG	Saint Augustine, Florida
757th Transportation Battalion (Railway)(-)	USAR	West Allis, Wisconsin
872nd Maintenance Company	USAR	Washington, Iowa
2361st Signal Detachment	USAR	Toledo, Ohio
5064th USAR Garrison	USAR	Inkster, Michigan
Transportation Company (Light Truck)	AC	Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
882nd Personnel Services Company*	USAR	Fort Snelling, Minnesota

* Although not activated, the 882nd PSC provided personnel to augment Fort McCoy operations through various drill and training status arrangements.

Role at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin

Upon arrival at Fort McCoy, Garrison personnel were integrated into the installation staff in accordance with mobilization plans. Integration was by directorate by rank with the senior military personnel of either the Fort McCoy staff or the 5064th, regardless of source, taking

responsibility for the newly merged staffs. Headquarters, 5064th USAR Garrison, was maintained as a separate command and the Commander, Colonel Al Gentry, assumed the additional duty as the Deputy Installation Commander.

During the first 90 days of activation at Fort McCoy, 5064th personnel worked actively with their counterparts, civilian and military, to insure mission success. Initially, processing soldiers and units was slow and steady and required few extraordinary efforts. The Soldier Readiness Center (SRC) and the Unit Readiness Center (URC) operated in accordance with plans developed through earlier MOBEXs and following directives from higher headquarters. However, it became apparent that the Fort McCoy organization would be overextended by the surge of units forecasted to arrive in a greatly compressed time frame in preparation for what was to become Operation DESERT STORM.

A provisional brigade-sized organization was established using the 5064th headquarters as the command and control element. The provisional brigade was responsible for processing, training, and command and control of all soldiers mobilized from late-November 1990 and later. At the peak of this period, three provisional battalions, with a staff of three personnel in each, were operating for command and control purposes and Readiness Group-Snelling personnel were brought in, formed a Mobilization Assistance Team (MAT), and were attached to the provisional brigade, but OPCON to the installation commander, to serve as primary trainers for the soldiers of the units assigned to the brigade. When the number of mobilizing units increased dramatically the MAT received help from other Readiness Groups. They topped out at 140 soldiers doing MAT duties.⁴⁰ Other changes included taking over complete operation of the post Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the URC, and the SRC. Also, a holding company was created, using the staff of the 5064th HHC. This unit became responsible for command and control and administrative support of non-deployable soldiers at Fort McCoy. These soldiers were integrated into post support and mobilization support by mission requirements and MOS. At any one time there were as many as 30 units at Fort McCoy undergoing mobilization processing and preparing for deployment. In the words of the Installation Commander, the formation of the provisional brigade and its battalions gave the activating RC unit and detachment commanders a "big Daddy" from whom they could get counsel and mission-related assistance with less delay than would have been the case if they had to get all that support from the Post Commander.⁴¹

The increased staffing required by this higher level of activity was gained through reassigning 5064th soldiers from their post garrison duties to direct support of the mobilization effort and the provisional brigade. Many soldiers were cross-trained into duties totally new to them. Essentially, the brigade and its staff, and the battalions provided the staff supervision to the mobilizing units, which the post staff had been doing when requirements were lighter.

With the increased activity and intensity in preparation for Operation DESERT STORM came the Wisconsin winter and during the height of the mobilization activity 30 inches of snow fell. The Garrison soldiers quickly adapted to wearing issued cold weather gear. The activity level also caused a reorganization of the rail and air loading activities with the 5064th becoming the major player in all of the outside activity. However, all shipments of equipment and deployments of unit personnel departed on schedule. Despite 24-hour a day operations, in all kinds of weather, there was no lost time due to injury.

Command and Control Responsibilities

Colonel Al Gentry, an industrial engineer by profession, was the Commander of the 5064th USAR Garrison while it was on active duty at Fort McCoy from 27 August 1990 to 26 August 1991. After that period, his command tour ended and he served as the Operations Officer of the 123rd ARCOM until retirement in 1993.

Colonel Raymond G. Boland, an Artillery officer, was the Regular Army commander of Fort McCoy during most of the mobilization and demobilization activity associated with Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He retired in June, 1991.

When the 5064th was initially mobilized, Colonel Gentry became Colonel Boland's Deputy, and he remained in that position. He, of course, retained command of the 5064th as well. When the 5064th headquarters element formed the provisional brigade for command and control of the mobilized RC units, Lieutenant Colonel Quentin Brainard, Deputy Commander of the 5064th, functioned as the commander of that brigade.

Relationships with the Installation Commander and Staff

Having two colonels in charge of things at Fort McCoy created some tensions, even though both avoided stepping on the other's toes. Both made a conscious decision to support the other.⁴² At Fort McCoy, since civilians were the functional directors and division chiefs on the post staff, they in fact ran the show. There were numerous reports that they were not willing to accept instruction and direction from 5064th personnel who were more senior than they. Indeed, the Garrison personnel were seen as a threat by some supervisors. (This is generally not the case in such situations, because mobilized Reservists usually want to return to their homes and civilian occupations as soon as the mobilization is over.) But, this type of sensitivity pointed up the need for flexible thinking and a willingness to bend a little so that all could get along and do the mission efficiently. Certainly, the Garrison Commander needed a

thick skin, because, in reality, he was not going to command the post as some doctrinal document might suggest.

The leadership of the 5064th USAR Garrison probably made a mistake in not shedding the 123rd ARCOM patch at the time they were mobilized. They should have gone right to a FORSCOM or Fourth Army patch, whichever was appropriate. They resisted that for three months and it caused a lot of tension with the Active Army personnel at Fort McCoy. In fact the Post Commander frequently remarked about it facetiously and, once activated, the 5064th was really in the Active Army.

Garrison personnel did a magnificent job at Fort McCoy--largely unsung. Staff supervisors from the post report that the unit did everything under the sun at Fort McCoy--painted, tied down equipment on trucks and railroad cars, and ran the airfield. Every unit mobilized through the post was met at the gate and hand-walked through their processing by 5064th USAR Garrison representatives. At Christmas time in 1990, the Garrison even provided a Santa to meet, greet, and farewell units as they deployed. Every post activity had Garrison personnel involved because the normal staff complement was far too meager for the large influx of units.

SGM Scott Cameron, the NCOIC in the Directorate of Logistics for many years, noted that soldiers from his DOL section did all the loading on rail cars going to the ports and on many of the aerial deployments from Volk Field as well. With so many units mobilizing through Fort McCoy, materiel was being shipped constantly and the loaders had to work around the clock at times. To show the level of dedication, SGM Cameron recalled Christmas Day, 1990, when some of his DOL soldiers took two semi-trailers from Fort McCoy to Saint Louis to pick up tires so new tires could be put on some vehicles which were being loaded out in the next few days. Since it was Christmas, they could have been exempted from going on that trip, but they wanted the trucks in the best shape possible for the troops who would be depending on them in the Gulf.⁴³

LTC John Emig, the Director of Logistics of the 5064th USAR Garrison, added some humorous anecdotes which also reflect the seriousness of the effort that everyone was putting into the mobilization station functions, and the high regard in which the Garrison's soldiers were held. The A/DACG which was manned by 5064th soldiers and headed by a LTC Scales, an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) to Fort McCoy, had a heavy commitment throughout the period of the Garrison's activation. One incident LTC Emig recounted, involved a medical unit which came back through Fort McCoy on the demobilization phase. When the duffle bags came off the plane at Volk Field on a conveyor belt, they were bulging with captured Iraqi weapons which the troops were taking home for souvenirs. This was unusual for a medical unit;

an infantry unit would have been more likely to have them. Probably, the Customs MP's in Saudi Arabia didn't even check a medical unit. At Volk Field, seeing this, the A/DACG personnel called the MPs and confiscated the weapons. It was also strange to see that the airplane's crew, which was civilian contract, allowed all those weapons on the plane, as well.

Another anecdote involved an ARNG transportation unit that came into Fort McCoy to deploy. The company commander was a very strong-willed person who was impressed with his prerogatives as the company commander. When the date came to rail-load his unit's trucks for shipment to the port they had not been painted with desert color or the CARC paint. The OIC of the rail loading from the Garrison was a very high strung officer of Hispanic nationality. He refused to load the vehicles since they were not ready for the Gulf, i.e., no paint. The company commander insisted they were going to go. The rail loading OIC was just as strong that they weren't. Things became very heated. The rail loading OIC's English became less and less understandable as the confrontation went on. The company commander was nose-to-nose with him. At that time an ARNG colonel also got into it and ordered the rail loading OIC to get the trucks loaded, but the captain stood firm that rail loading was his responsibility and they weren't going to be shipped overseas until they were ready--in this case painted properly. The Post command group backed the rail loading OIC once the matter got to them, and the colonel backed down. A humorous story when you project into it, but also revealing about the kind of backbone that's needed in the relatively junior ranks of Garrison personnel.⁴⁴

LTC Melvin A. Bauman, who was the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) at Fort McCoy, and is the SSA of the 5064th in his civilian occupation, singled out for special recognition a Sergeant Major James Koetsis, now retired. At that time he was the Garrison's Food Service Supervisor. At Fort McCoy he was called the "Cookie Man". He had spent 35 years in the 5064th and was extremely devoted to giving the troops good chow. He made cookies and cakes for every unit leaving for the Gulf and for every one that demobilized through Fort McCoy. He set an example that motivated his entire section such that they wanted to participate in this type of support to the troops, no matter the hour of day and the usual lack of notice. Over the year that the Garrison was at Fort McCoy, he and his section baked literally thousands of cookies and cakes. SGM Koetsis was a very special human being who did special things for the soldiers coming through Fort McCoy and single-handedly did much to enhance relationships between the Garrison and Fort McCoy on the one hand, and the mobilizing units on the other.⁴⁵

At Fort McCoy, because of the small permanent party complement, and therefore the visibility that the augmenting USAR Garrison received, there was more interface for Garrison personnel with the local civilian community than would have been the case at the larger division posts. The ability to influence local relationships was therefore great. The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), LTC Michael Updike, related some of his relationships with local officials. In one case

he got a call from the Game Warden of the county who said the post was giving out permits to kill deer illegally and that it had to stop and they had to withdraw the illegal permits that had been issued. After checking this out, he found that a few of the local wives were using the General Powers of Attorney to get deer hunting licenses for their soldier husbands. Deer permits, by a very old law, could only be obtained in person. As LTC Updike put it, they were city boys from Detroit and didn't know rural Wisconsin law. They had to remake the video they used to brief soldiers about Powers of Attorney, to specify that it did not apply to Wisconsin deer permits and they had to include in each Power of Attorney that it specifically did not cover deer permits. It was quite a job to get any permits back and he opined that deer season ended before that task was completed.

In another incident during his time as the SJA, a historical study of Fort McCoy, done with public and local historical society funds, came to him for review. It went far back in history. It ended with recommendations as to what should be saved on the installation. LTC Updike happens to have an interest in old cemeteries, and when he came upon discussion in the study about a second cemetery on post that should be saved and where certain historical figures were buried, he went out to look for it in his leisure time. It was not on the post map which showed only the main post cemetery. He did locate it--it was in the middle of the artillery impact area and only one gravestone was still standing.⁴⁶

Problems Encountered by the 5064th USAR Garrison

One problem, which Garrison personnel readily admitted was self-inflicted, involved personnel accountability. Incomplete alert rosters and the inability to reach unit personnel and ascertain their status, especially those without phones who lived throughout the Detroit area, turned out to be a very frustrating and labor-intensive problem to solve at such an already frenzied and busy period as a unit mobilization. Some were not contacted and problems resolved until after arrival of the Garrison at Fort McCoy, some four or five days after the unit was activated. This condition existed because the responsible personnel for this activity never dreamed the unit would be activated, and thus little urgency was given to supplying accurate alert roster data to the HHC.

A second major problem encountered by the unit involved incomplete or non-existent mobilization files for Garrison personnel. A team of specialists from the 123rd ARCOM in Indianapolis was dispatched to Detroit to assist the 5064th in upgrading these files and providing family support services to the unit's family members. ID Cards, wills, powers-of-attorney, family care plans, allotments and the like all needed to be prepared. The 5064th was the first activated RC unit to be ordered to report to Fort McCoy and it was necessary to "crash" to get

their administrative processing completed and get them to Fort McCoy so that the post could accept other mobilizing RC units. The lack of these administrative preparations being in place caused the Garrison much grief and frantic "catch-up" work during those first few days of activation. A member of the ARCOM team who went to the Garrison's home station to help ready the unit related the following anecdote which shows the state of mind of an unprepared soldier.

One deploying female soldier was heard to tell her mother as she said good-bye that the mother would have to care for the soldier's baby--the baby's father couldn't. The mother allowed as to how she had her own job; the soldier said she had put the mother down on the family care plan as the child's care-giver, never thinking she'd get activated. Then she hopped in a truck and was gone! The mother was left speechless at the Reserve Center.⁴⁷

A third problem unique to Fort McCoy and the 5064th Garrison's experience involved the lack of women's issue underwear in the supply system. Reserve and Guard units mobilizing through there exhausted local stocks very quickly; the same was happening throughout the country. The installation received permission to go out and buy bras, panties, and sanitary napkins locally when one hospital unit came in, which had a heavy female content. The Wal-Marts and K-Marts in Tomah, Sparta, and LaCrosse, Wisconsin were emptied. In fact the need was so great that the unit was delayed in deploying overseas on time.⁴⁸

A Salute

The above problems related to unit administration cannot be allowed to detract from the 5064th USAR Garrison's superb performance. There was only a small complement of permanent party at Fort McCoy when the 5064th arrived, as has been noted earlier. This was a much different situation into which this Garrison was placed than those which augmented division posts with well established infrastructures. Yet these soldiers threw themselves into the task with great energy and enthusiasm. There is no doubt that the other Garrisons activated did the same. What is different here is that the 5064th had very little help. They were it!

Comments from members of units that mobilized and demobilized through Fort McCoy reflected the marvelous support that the Garrison gave to those units. Comments of gratitude were made all the time by senior people, NCOs, and lower ranking soldiers alike.

The soldiers of the 5064th began to really learn the importance of their success in transitioning the newly activated units from civilian life to military life, from peace to war. The returning soldiers told and retold their experiences that when meeting with fellow RC soldiers

in the Gulf they began to realize that their experience at Fort McCoy had been something special and had indeed prepared them well for what was to come. This affirmation of success and the genuine and sincere appreciation expressed by the returning soldiers sustained the morale of the soldiers of the 5064th as they demobilized soldiers who had been mobilized well after themselves and who were now returning home well in advance of themselves.

The strength of the resolve and dedication of the soldiers of the 5064th was later demonstrated when unit members were given the opportunity to return home or to remain on active duty until the units were demobilized. Over 80% volunteered to remain through the projected heaviest demobilization period and over 60% committed to stay the mission through to the finish.

During the peak of this period, hundreds of soldiers in dozens of aircraft were landing returning soldiers and units at Volk Field, LaCrosse and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Minneapolis, Minnesota. From the first arrival through to the last, unit members volunteered during their off-duty hours to serve refreshments and to unload the cargo holds of the returning flights. No soldier returning to Fort McCoy had to carry his own baggage.

Clearly, the 5064th set a standard during that year on active duty that would be hard to surpass. It received an Army Superior Unit Award for its efforts during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

After-Action Report Issues

The TDA rewrite that takes effect 16 September 1994, may be a serious mistake. There is clearly a turf issue involved, i.e., who will be in the supervisory jobs during a mobilization. Many senior personnel are being written out of the TDA. Garrisons were never big enough; now they are being drawn down further. The 5064th has had no input into the TDA change. Not only are numbers of people lost, but varied backgrounds and experiences are also lost. Unlike Active Army soldiers and DA Civilians at the installation, USAR soldiers come with two backgrounds--their military experience and their civilian experience. This is invaluable during a mobilization because you simply cannot anticipate needs until they happen, and you cannot build all the needs into a TDA because of numbers constraints. This drawdown is reducing the flexibility available to the Fort McCoy supervisors for no good reason. It is amazing, for example, how many tradesmen were in the unit working in a totally unrelated MOS, but who could be summoned for repairs to a mess hall, a barracks, or building pallets, installing electricity, repairing copy machines, or whatever other needs might occur. Reductions by slices or percent are never popular, but in this case might be self-defeating. Management

infrastructure in plans and training and logistics is lost.

The revised TDA does not provide for command and control of the mobilizing units coming through Fort McCoy. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the provisional brigade was established as described earlier in this section, and the need for a permanent recognition in the TDA was a major lesson learned.

Finally, in the TDA issue related to the 5064th USAR Garrison the installation should have an integrated command and control structure for installation activities. There was not a good chain of military/civilian interface in effect at Fort McCoy. On the military side there were family problems for a chain of command to deal with; on the civilian side there were union complaints to deal with. A chain needs to coordinate the responses to such matters, and that's where the need for an integrated chain comes into play. In some staff sections at Fort McCoy, there was no integration, no one knew who worked for who.

3397th USAR Garrison

In a situation similar to that experienced by the 3220th USAR Garrison at Fort Stewart, the early activation of the 3397th USAR Garrison at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was essential to the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and to supporting the activation, training, and deployment of Reserve Component units mobilizing at Fort Campbell. When these units redeployed to their home stations through Fort Campbell, the 3397th assisted with their demobilization processing as well.

Augmenting the 3397th USAR Garrison at Fort Campbell was a variety of USAR and ARNG support units, as reflected in Figure 6. The 199th Combat Support Company was a repair parts supply company that was to deploy on the day the war ended, and this unit stayed on at Fort Campbell as a labor pool. The 706th Transportation Company was the last unit to be mobilized at Fort Campbell, and the war ended before it was deployed. Soldiers from the 706th performed a variety of post support duties for approximately two months and the unit was demobilized and returned to home station. The 1159th Medical Company had air ambulance platoons at Forts Knox, McCoy, and Campbell for medevac missions as required. The 3273rd USAR Hospital was a CONUS Augmentation Hospital, whose mission was to expand the Fort Campbell post hospital to 1,000 beds and to back-fill losses of nurses and physicians who had deployed to the Gulf under the PROFIS system.⁴⁹

Figure 6.

Fort Campbell Base Operations Support Units

Unit	Component	Home Station
141st Veterinary Detachment	USAR	Columbia, Missouri
199th Combat Support Company	USAR	Grissom Air Force Base, Indiana
706th Transportation Company	USAR	Mansfield, Ohio
1159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance)(-)	ARNG	Concord, New Hampshire
3273rd USAR Hospital	USAR	Greenville, South Carolina
3397th USAR Garrison	USAR	Chattanooga, Tennessee

Status at the Time of Activation

The 3397th USAR Garrison has had a 30 year association with Fort Campbell. Originally its mission was to operate Fort McClellan, Alabama, then Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and it was organized that way. In the early 1980's the ARNG took over the installation support mission at Camp Shelby, as they did all through CONUS for state-owned installations which were earmarked as mobilization stations. At that time, the 3397th Garrison's augmentation mission was changed to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. When Operation DESERT SHIELD began, the 3397th had begun downsizing in accordance with a TDA cut announced in early 1990. The Garrison arrived at Fort Campbell with approximately 250 soldiers, down from a strength of about 360.

Prior to Operation DESERT SHIELD's announcement, FORSCOM had proposed to its CONUS Armies and installations that USAR Garrisons be eliminated and that their role be assumed by non-deploying installation staff (predominantly civilians), augmented by Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and Individual Ready Reservists (IRR). Fort Campbell had nonconcurred with that approach, instead wanting the Garrison unit and personnel with whom they had participated in exercise and counterpart training. Fort Campbell did want a TDA revision to eliminate some of the senior positions and make the Garrison more reflective of the installation's needs as the mobilization planners envisioned them.⁵⁰

Prior to the Operation DESERT SHIELD activation in support of Fort Campbell, and since deactivation, the 3397th has acted as a major subordinate command of the 125th ARCOM. In that role, the 3397th exercises command and control in peacetime over eight companies and detachments in the eastern half of Tennessee.⁵¹ This assists in alleviating the ARCOM's very wide span of control. It also serves as a training distractor, albeit not a critical one, to the headquarters element of the Garrison because of the administrative duties attendant to this role. It did not in any way hamper the Garrison's ability to assume their mobilization mission immediately upon their call-up.

Role at Fort Campbell

The 3397th USAR Garrison provided the command and control element, called Deployment Command, for activating RC units at Fort Campbell, except the 196th Field Artillery Brigade, a Tennessee National Guard brigade. The brigade commander felt he needed to develop teamwork in his staff and with his battalions. Two of them were from the West Virginia and Kentucky ARNG and had not previously worked with the brigade headquarters and the third battalion, both of which were from the Tennessee ARNG. Additionally, the Deployment Command was stretched thin at the time the 196th reported, processing 19 units for deployment validation.⁵² Fort Campbell delegated UCMJ authority to the 3397th to exercise over the deploying RC units, as required.

Soldiers from the 3397th augmented the installation's staff sections on a 24 hour a day basis, as well as operating the Deployment Command. The largest single concentration of soldiers worked at the air field in the A/DACG. These soldiers actually loaded out the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), as well as the mobilizing RC units that were committed to the Gulf. Another large contingent manned the post's Central Issue Facility (CIF).

Finally, unlike other Garrisons activated for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the 3397th performed a training role for the mobilized RC units. The Garrison formed committees to support marksmanship range training, NBC school and gas chamber exercises, and other survival skills training. The MAT team provided some trainers, as well, to augment this Garrison effort.

Command and Control Responsibilities

Colonel William B. Raines, Jr., the Commander of the 3397th, had only recently assumed command of the unit. He commanded the Deployment Command that managed the

training and deployment of the RC units at Fort Campbell. He worked under the Active Army Garrison Commander, Colonel John Seymour, who commanded the installation once the 101st Airborne Division's commander deployed to the Gulf. Colonel Tommy C. Stiner, the MAT Chief, was a major contributor to the training of deploying RC units and he exercised the responsibility to validate the units for deployment to the Gulf. These three colonels worked well together, a major factor in the success that they achieved at Fort Campbell.

Relationships with the Installation Commander and Staff

The Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Major General J. H. Binford Peay, III, was primarily oriented on getting the division ready to deploy to the Gulf. He had no significant relationship with the 3397th USAR Garrison. The long association between the members of the 3397th, and their civilian and AC counterparts on the installation staff, however, helped greatly in the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia initially, and later the mobilization processing mission and deployment of the RC units whose mobilization station was Fort Campbell. The Mobilization Planner, Mr. Bredlau, stated that there was a very healthy attitude displayed by all staff sections toward the 3397th. As well, the staff was very positive toward the other RC units mobilizing through Fort Campbell and worked to help them. Mr. Bredlau felt that one thing that gave the units much credibility with the post staff was the great and diversified civilian skills talent embodied in these Reserve units, particularly the 3397th where many senior managers in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) were assigned. It should be noted here that the TVA is a major employer in the region and is the major provider of power in several southeastern states, so there is much name recognition of that industry.⁵³

The major factor that led to a strong relationship between the 3397th and the Fort Campbell installation commander, Colonel Seymour, and his staff, was the fact that the Garrison came to do a job and they jumped right into it. In many cases the support elements of the 101st had deployed before the combat elements. The remaining units assigned on the post could not pick up their load. However, the 3397th soldiers with their military training and civilian skills could, and did, pick up the support missions by loading planes and rail cars, operating fork lifts, cranes, and other materiel handling equipment, driving trucks and buses, and exhibiting all the building trades skills by doing building maintenance and constructing hundreds of pallets. In short, logistical support to the 101st as it was deploying was a huge task. The Air Assault TOE makes it a heavy division for all intents and purposes, especially when weight and cube and aircraft allocation requirements kick in. It needs as many sorties as a heavy division. So the 3397th soldiers got a real workout those first three weeks assisting the division's deployment.

After that frantic period, Garrison soldiers were phased into the installation staff sections to backfill for the departed 101st soldiers and to provide the necessary augmentation for the mobilization processing of activating RC units which were beginning to flow onto the post. In the DPCA area, for example, three soldiers were assigned to the Strength Management Section; six worked in the Personnel Records Section; a major was the G1 representative to the EOC; another officer functioned as liaison between the mobilizing RC units and the Personnel Processing Center supervisors; and two soldiers worked in ID cards and dog tag production. These troops augmented the 100 civilians who were working in Post G1/AG. Additionally, the Deployment Command had an S1 section which did many of the personnel actions required by the mobilizing units, which would have fallen on the installation personnel, otherwise. In the area of mobilization processing, the Deployment Command scheduled the processing and the Soldier Processing Center administered the mobilization processing.

Mr. Ralph Schultz, the Chief of Personnel Processing at that time, was very strong in his opinion that the 3397th did a superb job in the personnel processing area. He confirmed that their proficiency was due to their long association with the Fort Campbell staff and the continued training they get on mobilization exercises and annual training. He reported that many of the Garrison officers and NCOs, who augment the G1/DPCA staff sections come in and have coffee and kibitz, even when they're driving past the installation on the interstate.⁵⁴

A mobilization planner from the Fort Campbell Directorate of Logistics (DOL) explained that when the division's direct support units on the post stand down to deploy, i.e., DISCOM and the corps support units, the post is hurt in its ability to support the division. Usually that stand down occurs for DISCOM at the same time as the combat elements of the division. Those service support type units need to be in the mission area to render support to the brigades as soon as possible. The corps support units at Fort Campbell which are to support the 101st in the operational area, stand down a little later, but not a long time later, i.e., days, not weeks. So, they can render some deployment support to the division for a while. The post needs assistance from the RC to fill these gaps right away. During Operation DESERT SHIELD this sequence took place, and while this process should be understood and therefore orderly and coordinated, it wasn't understood in the CONUSA or FORSCOM and the support elements did not fit smoothly into their roles. For example, parts ordering which is automated and linked into SAILS by software in the AC support units, was not in that state in the RC follow-on units which came to Fort Campbell to either mobilize through the post or augment the post (to include the Garrison). Thus, parts had to be manually ordered, run around physically and signatures obtained--hard to do when there are so many and a unit is preparing to deploy to a combat zone or trying to familiarize itself with the post and render timely support to those deploying. The 3397th personnel assigned to DOL got right into this area and were very supportive. Had it not been for their initiative, the situation would have gotten out of hand. In the other logistics areas,

such as transporting deploying soldiers and unit equipment, the Garrison soldiers played a heavy role as well. It should be noted that 78 Garrison soldiers were assigned to DOL, the majority working in the A/DACG.⁵⁵

In planning maintenance support to mobilizing RC units, DOL received word of the unit's alert, its location, and its planned arrival. They would send a materiel assistance and inspection team (MAIT) to the unit's home station, inspect equipment, and develop a program to fix any problems when the unit actually arrived at Fort Campbell. This included getting a head start on parts supply. The 3397th soldiers who augmented the post's direct support maintenance shops participated in this effort.

At Fort Campbell, the Military Police support requirement was very heavy. Upon the deployment of the division, the 101st MP Company and the 194th MP Company accompanied the division. That left only 120 law enforcement personnel of all types on the post. To augment them the installation required 25 MPs from the 3397th and 23 who were IMAs and IRRs. The 3397th MPs are critical to the installation because in essence they are a platoon which can be trained as road patrol/security/customs. The 120 would be tailored for staffing the Headquarters Company of the Law Enforcement Command (command and control) and MP investigations and more road patrol. Additionally, the installation has an AR 5-9 responsibility which includes AWOL apprehension, court liaison and security of Reserve centers throughout Tennessee and 28 counties of Kentucky.

When the 101st was preparing to leave, and during their deployment over two to three weeks, the post's MP requirement was very heavy. Corps support elements were also getting ready to leave for the Gulf. RC units were starting to roll in, and convoys seemed to be everywhere. Family members were streaming in from afar to say goodbye to their deploying relatives. MPs were a critical resource at that time.

The 3397th gave extraordinary support to Fort Campbell during that hectic period and throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Major Leach functioned as the Executive Officer of the Law Enforcement Command and Deputy Provost Marshal; Captain Herman was S3 of the Law Enforcement Command and headed the MP Investigations section; Master Sergeant Canter was the S3 Training NCO in the Law Enforcement Command and USAR Coordinator between the mobilizing units and the military police; SP5 Johnson was responsible in the PMO for AWOL apprehension, liaison to civil courts, and prisoner escort to and from Fort Knox; and several troops were street patrolmen.

One big effort which the MPs had to control was the customs inspections when the units, both AC and RC, redeployed through Fort Campbell. Soldiers are soldiers and these troops

were getting out of the Gulf with all kinds of contraband, particularly weapons and explosive devices that absolutely could not get out into the population at large or on the streets. So, it took a major share of the Law Enforcement Command's resources to manage customs. Again, the 3397th played a big role. Mr. Bill Wheeler, the mobilization planner from the Provost Marshal's office categorically stated that the police effort could not have been successful without the fantastic professionalism of the 3397th MP augmentees to Fort Campbell. Major Leach, who is now the Provost Marshal of the 3397th USAR Garrison, felt that he and his MPs had been totally integrated into the installation's Law Enforcement Command, treated with professional respect, and exposed to the full gamut of missions and staff actions during the eleven months at Fort Campbell. In short, the MP effort was a real success story.⁵⁶

A final note on the mutually respectful and positive relationships between the 3397th and the other elements on Fort Campbell. Probably, the key to it was intangible, but reflective of a philosophy the 3397th leaders brought with them to the mission, and it "infected" everyone in the unit. The philosophy used in supporting mobilizing RC units was to treat them as if they were sons and daughters going off to war. Assistance, rather than a dictatorial attitude or harassment to make them "soldiers", and a sincere desire to help were projected routinely. It came across to them, too, as they all talked about it after they returned from the Gulf and compared their treatment at Fort Campbell to that of other units at other mobilization stations that they had heard about. Even after the deploying units had left for the Gulf, the Garrison did follow-up on requisitioned equipment which had not come in yet, and personnel actions of one type or another, even though the soldier involved might have gone to the Gulf. Lieutenant Colonel Marvin Bollinger, then the 3397th Executive Officer, stressed that this caring attitude is what made the Garrison different from any of the other units, regardless of component, that he observed at the post.⁵⁷

One example that Lieutenant Colonel Bollinger related certainly qualifies as typical of the type of caring cited. It involved a long-haul truck driver in civilian life who was in one of the activating RC units. During a "mugging" somewhere he had lost an ear. He was not going to be allowed to deploy without the ear, and he would probably have not been able to remain in the USAR. However, the Deployment Command worked with the Fort Campbell hospital and found a cosmetic surgeon who would come in as a specialist and do the ear reconstruction operation. Within about a month the soldier was fixed up and the scars were healed enough for the soldier to deploy and join his unit. The bottom line is that the actions taken were not necessary, especially as busy as everyone at Fort Campbell was at that time. But, the extra effort paid off for the soldier and his unit.

Lieutenant Colonel Whitley, the S3 of the Deployment Command during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, also referred to the Garrison's commitment to the

"helping hand" concept, whereby the 3397th operating the Deployment Command, nurtured the mobilizing RC units by actually meeting them at the gate as they arrived, taking them by the hand and walking them through every step of mobilization processing on a strange, big post, until they deployed.⁵⁸ He related, too, that when units returned for their demobilization processing they told 3397th and Fort Campbell personnel stories about other units' experiences, and how lucky they felt to have been given so much help on the way to the Gulf, right at the time they were experiencing the trauma of mobilization and fear of the unknown.⁵⁹

Residual Controls⁶⁰

Major General Peay tried to retain a close residual control over activity at Fort Campbell, while preparing to deploy to the Gulf and during the months that he and the 101st were in the operational area. This desire to control things at Fort Campbell manifested itself in several ways and certainly made things difficult at times for the installation staff and the mobilizing RC units, including the 3397th USAR Garrison.

The reaction and attitude of the TOE command and staff was predictable and understandable, albeit disconcerting. They rarely, if ever had an opportunity to play a MOBEX and become knowledgeable on how the mobilization system would work. The delay in intelligence and guidance from the national level compounded the problem. The TDA staff however, had been deeply involved in every MOBEX and knew what to expect. They were therefore prepared and attempting to convince their principals that it was okay to do certain things. They knew from MOBEX experience that prepositioned guidance and amendments to restrictive policies and regulations would be forthcoming if we were to be serious and successful in mobilization.⁶¹

The division tried to take everything it could. General Peay did not want to leave anything behind. He left instructions the Reservists were not to spend division/post money. Any discussion was always prefaced by the question of whether it was Reserve-related, and if so, who was paying for it. The division even commandeered a plane for self-service supplies and another for Christmas trees to move to the desert. Those troops remaining behind, plus troops of the 3397th, had the task to build 200 extra pallets that the division wanted shipped over.

Cross leveling from the AC into mobilizing RC units occurred at mobilization stations throughout CONUS. At Fort Campbell one really tough problem came up in that area. At the time the 196th Field Artillery Brigade activated, they needed some personnel with cannoneer skills. There were some soldiers with the right MOS in the Reception Battalion at the post.

They had recently reported in. Since General Peay had continued to retain a close string on things occurring at Fort Campbell while he was in the Gulf, the post queried him on assigning these troops to the 196th Field Artillery Brigade and he said no. The 196th commander was upset, and reportedly the TAG of Tennessee took it up with FORSCOM who supported General Peay that those troops were earmarked for the division originally and the National Guard couldn't have them. This made for some hard feelings, but how that all played out is not the subject of this paper. It does prove how important mutual respect is between elements of the Active and Reserve Components, and how important the concept of Total Army is, because after mobilization, all activated units are, in theory at least, supposed to be all one Army--Active Army.

Problems Experienced

As explained earlier in this section on the 3397th, the deployment of the Active Army military police units left the post with inadequate law enforcement personnel, even with the addition of the military police assets of the 3397th. There were no MP units activated for a garrison support role to offset this shortage of police personnel. This problem was solved by using assets of the 401st MP Battalion, a USAR unit from Nashville, Tennessee, in multiple 45-day ADT cycles and finally by the activation of the 401st for post support. As well, the installation's detention facility was closed, which freed up about sixty people. Although of different skills, they were cross-trained and assigned to road control coverage.

A TDA change being considered will increase further the 3397th Provost Marshal Section to further alleviate the installation's shortage of law enforcement personnel when the 101st Airborne Division deploys.

Housing for activating RC units, including the 3397th, was a major problem. The 101st Airborne Division personnel had left their personal belongings in their troop billets, impeding use of these facilities to house the activating RC units. RC units were forced to occupy substandard facilities in deteriorating World War II structures that were scheduled for and in the process of being demolished.

A related problem facing the installation was the availability of motor pool space for the activating RC units. When the divisional and corps support units deployed, they filled their motor pools with the POVs of their soldiers. This was done to provide a measure of security for the soldiers who had deployed. While this provided security for the POVs, it prevented the activating RC units from using the motor pools.

For the 3397th, on-post transportation was a problem. There was a real shortage of organic transportation for the unit to accomplish its required missions. Many of the transportation assets normally used in the post support role were organic to units in the division. With the division deployed, there was not enough transportation available to meet all the requirements generated by the need to support the activated RC units. Exacerbating this was the fact that Fort Campbell is a large, spread out installation. Even personal transportation was a problem for the personnel of the 3397th, because it had been decided that privately owned vehicles would not accompany the unit to Fort Campbell. As the personal transportation issue was identified, the decision to restrict POVs was reversed and many soldiers were able to return to their homes to get their personal vehicles and bring them to Fort Campbell.

However, no matter their willingness, using personal automobiles to transact government business is not a satisfactory solution. For example, MSG Garland Yarborough, the senior administrative NCO in the DPCA section, put 12,000 miles on his brand new POV getting his job done in a six month period. He bought all the gas, too.⁶² Positive and can-do--? Yes. But, this should not be expected.

After-Action Report Issues

A major threat to the continued ability of the 3397th to function as well as it did on Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM is a desire on the part of some of the supervisory staff personnel at Fort Campbell to revise downward the TDA of the Garrison--both in terms of numbers and rank structure. The TDA issue is applicable not only to the four Garrisons that were activated during the Gulf War but to others that were not. The Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM experience of the 3397th at Fort Campbell is that the rank level is very important to the mobilizing units being able to get post-level support required to mobilize and deploy without delays. Advice, nurturing and experienced coaching, are all necessary to assist these mobilizing elements. Functionally, the expertise of senior people is needed as well. The Garrison personnel are convinced that the attempts to downgrade the rank level is a turf issue--the civilians at Fort Campbell don't want any jeopardizing of their supervisory capacity, and thus any of their own grade structure. One officer made the point that a group of captains and majors cannot assist a mobilizing unit commander as well as a colonel, lieutenant colonel deputy, and lieutenant colonel staff chiefs. Further, the civilians at Fort Campbell cannot function in a military chain of command because they are not military, and they need not feel threatened since the Reservists, fundamentally, want to go back home to their own professions as soon as they can. Everything argues for retention of the same grade structure as during Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Further, the Deployment Command concept was great. In effect it acted as a translator--like an agent for a professional athlete. It was a superb vehicle to have in place for service to Reserve Component units which were understandably nervous and doubting their preparation for the ordeal ahead. But, as Lieutenant Colonel Bollinger points out, a unit needs rank and experience to perform that role, and the threat to the 3397th TDA puts that in jeopardy.⁶³ In fact, it does not provide for the Deployment Command as structured during the 3397th activation.

The DPCA of the 3397th worked on some force development actions reference the Garrison while activated during Operation DESERT STORM. Since the unit had already downsized in reaction to a previous TDA change prior to Operation DESERT SHIELD, the opportunity presented itself to document the Garrison's needs in a live setting. Lieutenant Colonel Beecher Allison sat down with each section in the 3397th and the installation to try to determine the real needs of the unit. The desk audits he did produced documents just like the schedules X of a formal manpower survey. He deduced from this the requirement for 600 personnel per the justified needs as demonstrated during Operation DESERT SHIELD. He knows that Fort Campbell does not go along with his recommended organization. In fact the installation has come up with what he considers to be a very unworkable TDA which renders the unit much less effective than it needs to be.⁶⁴

Reflections on USAR Garrisons

The Garrison TDA Issue

During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, USAR Garrison TDAs were in a state of revision. Additionally, some of the Garrisons were being eliminated from the force structure under the QUICKSILVER program. The combination of these two events resulted in a variety of Garrison organizational structures being activated to support their respective installations. In spite of organizational difficulties, the four USAR Garrisons activated for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were able to successfully execute their mobilization missions.

The role of the USAR Garrison is to augment the supported installation upon mobilization. The needs of each installation are unique and specialized. A standard USAR Garrison organization will not satisfy the needs of every mobilization station any more than a

single type of organization would apply to all transportation companies. The organization must be tailored to fit the size, complexity of functions, residual staffing at mobilization, and mission of the installation. Some installations have robust staffing to accomplish their peacetime mission, while others depend upon tenant, frequently deployable divisions or corps units for support in performing installation functions. Others, like Fort McCoy, have minimum levels of staffing to support the unique mission of the installation which is to support RC training, primarily.

The success of the four activated USAR Garrisons in accomplishing their missions was due, in no small part, to the wealth of talent from the civilian job skills of the members of the Garrisons. The grade structure of these Garrisons supported the retention of a pool of key civilian business leaders and highly skilled tradesmen, who offered much more than their military MOS skills. The organizational structure of the Garrisons provided opportunity for advancement within the unit, affording the unit stability in key personnel and the development of a lasting relationship with the supported installation.

The same senior level positions that provided stability to the USAR Garrisons, and enhanced their mobilization contribution, was considered by some civilian employees on supported installations to be a threat to their own positions and level of responsibility. As a result of this perceived threat, there have been cases where the supported installation staff has opposed revisions to the Garrison TDA that would have a grade structure appropriate for the Garrison mission and that would aid in retaining the skilled personnel that made the Garrisons successful in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

The Garrison TDA should pose no threat to the installation staff. The role of the Garrison is temporary, for mobilization, not as a replacement for the installation staff for an extended period of time. The grade level of the personnel is to recognize the leadership and experience required to handle the situations encountered by an installation during a mobilization.

Role as an Intermediate Command

The use of the USAR Garrison as an intermediate command within the ARCOM provides the ARCOM with a senior level commander to oversee smaller units of the ARCOM. This reduces the span of control for the ARCOM headquarters and provides direct supervision, leadership, and staff support to units commanded by junior, less experienced personnel. While there are significant benefits to be gained by the subordinate units and the ARCOM headquarters, there is a price paid by the Garrison for providing this service.

The best training for the USAR Garrison comes from performing garrison type functions at, or for, their supported installation. The closer the frequent training affiliation, the better prepared the Garrison will be for mobilization. Fragmented Annual Training (AT) by elements of the Garrison staff sections enhances the ability of the Garrison to respond quickly to the needs of the supported installation. This includes the command element of the Garrison, which benefits from a close association with the supported installation leadership. The closer this commander to commander relationship, the better prepared will be the two organizations to work together during mobilization.

At mobilization, the activated Garrison becomes fully committed to its role with the supported installation. This is the same time that its subordinate units are in the greatest need for assistance from their higher command. These two missions are in direct conflict at a time when both must be paramount. In some ARCOMs, because of geographical dispersion of units or the lack of intermediate level commands, it will be necessary to use Garrisons in the role of intermediate command. In those instances, when selecting USAR Garrisons for an intermediate command role, the ARCOM should consider the impact on both the Garrison and its subordinate units at mobilization. In some cases, it may be possible for the subordinate units of the Garrison to be those units that would be expected to augment the same installation that the Garrison will serve upon mobilization. Clearly this could benefit the Garrison, its subordinate units, and the supported installation. As a general rule, the use of Garrisons as intermediate commands should be avoided.

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End Notes

1. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, ANDRULIS Research Corporation, to Fort Campbell, KY, the 125th ARCOM in Nashville, TN, and the 3397th USAR Garrison in Chattanooga, TN, 1-5 December 1993, dated 8 December 1993.
2. Appendix to the Congressional Record of May 4, 1965, p. A 2138.
3. Ibid.
4. Per MAJ O'Shaughnessy, Force Development Division, OCAR, 10 May 1994.
5. This chart was derived from information obtained in a HQDA (DAAR-OP-O) troop unit listing of USAR units activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. It was prepared by Joanne C. Krol, on 6 January 1992.
6. ANDRULIS Research Corporation monograph entitled: Individual Manpower Mobilization: The Army Reserve Personnel Center, 30 November 1992, p. 12. A full discussion of IMA utilization by command is found in pages 3-20.
7. ANDRULIS Research Corporation monograph entitled: Augmenting the Training Base: The Army Reserve in Support of TRADOC, 1 April 1994, p. 19.
8. Interview with LTC Miles Hitchcock, Deputy Commander, 4013th USAR Garrison (S-3 during Operation DESERT STORM) and background paper prepared by LTC Hitchcock for the interview, 11 December 1993.
9. Ibid.
10. Interview with Mr. Ken Johnson, Operations Officer, DPTMS, Fort Polk, LA, 8 December 1993.
11. Interview with LTC Miles Hitchcock, 11 December 1993.
12. Interview with Mr. Tad McClung, SSA, 4013th USAR Garrison, 11 December 1993.
13. Interview with COL Larry Rambin, Commander of the 4013th USAR Garrison during Operation DESERT STORM, 12 December 1993.
14. Trip report of John Seitz, ANDRULIS Research Corporation, to Fort Polk and Bossier City, LA, 8-12 December 1993, dated 23 December 1993.

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid. For additional information on the activation of USAR medical personnel see ANDRULIS Research Corporation monograph entitled: Reservists of the Army Medical Department, dated 23 September 1993.
18. Ibid.
19. DESERT SHIELD/STORM SUMMARY, Fort Polk EOC, undated.
20. Interview with COL Rambin, 12 December 1993.
21. Trip Report of John Seitz, 23 December 1993.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, ANDRULIS Research Corporation, to Fort Stewart, GA, and the 3220th USAR Garrison in West Palm Beach, FL, 3-8 November 1994, dated 16 November 1993.
25. Ibid.
26. The Wildcat, Spring 1991, published by the 81st ARCOM, Atlanta, GA, p.30.
27. Telephone interview with COL Burgamy, 15 November 1993.
28. Ibid.
29. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, 16 November 1993.
30. Command Briefing, 3220th USAR Garrison.
31. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, 16 November, 1993.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.
35. Interview with MAJ John Knight, 7 November 1994.
36. Telephone interview with COL Burgamy, 15 November 1993.
37. Letter, HQ, 123rd ARCOM, Subject: Army Superior Unit Award, dated 7 January 1993.
38. Interview, COL Al Gentry, Commander, 5064th USAR Garrison during Operation DESERT SHIELD, in Richmond, IN on 25 October 1993.
39. A complete discussion of the extent of rail support to Fort McCoy is found in Appendix A to the ANDRULIS Research Corporation monograph entitled United States Army Reserve in Operation DESERT STORM: Ground Transportation Operations, dated 14 June 1994.
40. Interview with COL Robert Michaud, MAT Chief, as reported in the Fort McCoy TRIAD, 4 January 1991, p.6.
41. Interview with COL Raymond G. Boland, 3 January 1991, at Fort McCoy, WI.
42. Interview with COL Gentry, 25 October 1993.
43. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, ANDRULIS Research Corporation to the 123rd ARCOM and 5064th USAR Garrison, 25 and 26 October 1993, dated 28 October 1993.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Telephonic interview with LTC Michael Updike, 26 October 1993.
47. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, 28 October 1993.
48. Interview with COL Gentry, 25 October 1993.
49. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, ANDRULIS Research Corporation, to Fort Campbell, KY; the 125th ARCOM in Nashville, TN; and the 3397th USAR Garrison in Chattanooga, TN, 1-5 December 1993, dated 8 December 1993.
50. Interview with Mr. Al Bredlau, Mobilization Plans Director, and LTC Bell, AGR Deputy Mobilization Plans Director, in the DPTM Office, Fort Campbell, KY, on 1 December 1993.

51. Telephonic confirmation of this mission was obtained from Mr. Tom Bixby, the SSA of the 3397th USAR Garrison, on 30 June 1994.
52. Interview, Mr. Bredlau and LTC Bell, 1 December 1993.
53. Ibid.
54. Interview with Mr. Ralph Schultz, Chief of Personnel Processing, G1 Section, Fort Campbell, 2 December 1993.
55. Interview with Mr. Frank Bone, Plans and Operations Branch, DOL Office at Fort Campbell, 2 December 1993.
56. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, 8 December 1993.
57. Interview with Mr. Marvin Bollinger, City Manager's Office, Fredericksburg, VA, 7 January 1994.
58. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, 8 December 1993.
59. Ibid.
60. The gist of this section comes from several sources during the visit to Fort Campbell, KY by Mr. Theodore S. Silva, of ANDRULIS Research Corporation. It will not be attributed to any one person because it is so controversial, and the feelings were so pervasive across the staff.
61. Memorandum from Mr. Albert H. Bredlau, Chief, Installation Mobilization Plans, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 13 July 1994.
62. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, 8 December 1993.
63. Interview, LTC Bollinger, 7 January 1994.
64. Trip Report of Theodore S. Silva, 8 December 1993.